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Abstract
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) repeatedly showed itself to
be one of the most inventive and adaptive of all the violent non-state
actors who operated in the latter part of the twentieth century. Among its
most innovative exploits was the PIRA’s successful development and
fielding – spanning almost its entire operational lifetime – of improvised
mortar systems. This chapter will trace the sustained development of
mortars, including the underlying motivations for pursuing mortars as a
complex engineering effort, the process by which the development took
place and the underpinnings of its success. The discussion will show that
the PIRA’s mortar development program was born out of tactical
necessity but enabled by good organizational practices and the
organization’s access to materials, expertise and places in which to
leverage these.
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Introduction 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)1 was viewed by its allies and 
adversaries alike as one of the most inventive, innovative, and adaptive of 
all the violent non-state actors who operated in the latter part of the 
twentieth century.2  During its almost three decades of attacks against 
civilians and security forces from 1969 until its last ceasefire in 1998, the 
PIRA employed a plethora of means of murder and mayhem, ranging from 
small arms (most notoriously the Armalite assault rifle), to rocket-propelled 
grenades, flamethrowers, heavier machine guns (such as the M60), and an 
almost dizzying array of improvised explosive and incendiary devices.3  The 
focus here, however, will be on the PIRA’s successful development and 
fielding–spanning almost its entire operational lifetime–of improvised 
mortars.  Error! Reference source not found. shows the various generations of 
mortars that the PIRA developed, from its first highly hazardous and 
relatively ineffectual attempts in the early 1970s, to its massive ‘barracks 
busters’ of the 1990s.  When it comes to judging the success of the PIRA’s 
adoption efforts, it is apparent from Error! Reference source not found.that the 
PIRA, barely two years after its first tentative attempts,4 succeeded in 
producing a reasonably reliable and safe weapon that at least some of the 
time resulted in physical damage and casualties, thus achieving a minimal 
level of success.  Further, by the middle of the 1990s, PIRA mortars were 
evaluated as comparable in quality to military models.5 
 
Most importantly for measuring success, the PIRA did launch several mortar 
attacks that caused serious injuries or fatalities and some that qualified as 
‘spectaculars’.6  Among the more notable mortar attacks were: 
                                                          
1 For more general information on the PIRA, see Moloney, Ed, A Secret History of the 
IRA (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2002), 46-71; also Coogan, Tim P., 
The IRA (New York, NY: Palgrave for St. Martin's Press, 2002); and English, Richard 
Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
2 Oppenheimer, A.R., IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets, A History of Deadly Ingenuity 
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009), 231. 
3 See Coogan, The IRA, 431-432; and Oppenheimer, passim, especially pp. 137, 170. 
Although never put into practice, the PIRA also reportedly worked on building fuel-air 
bombs, torpedoes, GPS-guided car bombs, and its own surface-to-air missiles 
(Oppenheimer, IRA, xviii, 9). 
4 The interval between the appearance of the Mark 1 mortar (1972) and the far more 
effective Mark 6 (1974). 
5 Geraghty, Tony, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British 
Intelligence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 192.  
6 Although never causing nearly the scope of death and destruction as the so-called ‘city 
buster’ bombs in London and Manchester in the 1990s, the Downing Street and 
Heathrow mortar attacks were notorious more for the nature of the target than anything 
else. 
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1. Newry Police Station (February 28, 1985): The local unit and South 
Armagh volunteers launched nine Mark 10 mortar shells from a 
hijacked truck aimed at the RUC station in Corry Square, Newry. Eight 
shells overshot the station, but one landed on a canteen, killing 9 
policemen and injuring 37 other people.7 
 
2. Downing Street Attacks (February 7, 1991): During British Cabinet 
deliberations regarding the Gulf War, the PIRA fired three Mark 10 
mortars from a specially-constructed opening in a van parked near 
Downing Street, central London. One mortar hit a tree and detonated 
several metres short of its target, shattering the blast windows in the 
Cabinet Room, forming a wide crater in the gardens and severely 
damaging Nos. 11 and 12 Downing Street.  The other two shells did not 
explode and were rendered safe.8  According to a law enforcement 
source familiar with the attack, the mortars were actually quite 
accurate–the only reason they missed the target was that the ranging 
mark on the pavement that the attack team had made the previous day 
had been washed away by snow, and the team had to estimate its 
position on the day of the attack, resulting in a few metres’ 
discrepancy.9  Had this intervention by Mother Nature not occurred, 
there might very well have been a direct hit on the Cabinet. 
 
3. Heathrow Airport Attacks (March 8, 10 and 13, 1994): A PIRA team 
fired three separate salvos of 4-5 Mark 6 mortars at Heathrow 
Airport’s northern runway and Terminal Four building.  One bomb 
landed on the roof of Terminal Four, which had approximately 4,000 
occupants at the time.  None of the mortars exploded, perhaps because 
the PIRA had not intended them to, but one widely-held opinion is 
that they had been sabotaged by security forces or an informer.10  
Nonetheless, the targeting of a facility in which a successful attack 
could have caused thousands of civilian casualties represented one of 
the most ambitious attacks by the PIRA up to this time and the fact 
                                                          
7 One of the former law enforcement officials remarked to the author that, although the 
accuracy was reasonable, the attack was not quite as successful as often reported, since 
only one of the eight mortars detonated. Author interview with former Northern Ireland 
law enforcement official ‘C’. 
8 Oppenheimer, Andy, 30 Years of IEDs: The Operational Art of the Provisional IRA, 
PIRA–Lessons Learned Conference (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 17 
April 2012).  
9 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’. 
10 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 424. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1501
 14 
 
that a second and third attack were possible despite increased security 
caused embarrassment for authorities.11 
 
Irrespective of casualties, all of these attacks had substantial psychological 
impact (the raison d’être of genuine terrorism).  This, together with the 
casualties that were caused and the drastic improvements in the weapons 
themselves, lends weight to a conclusion that, as a whole, the PIRA 
successfully adopted the weapons technology of mortar systems.  The 
important questions are why and how they did this. 
 
Decision 
Evidence points towards the PIRA’s decision to develop mortars as being 
driven by the perceived need to address a specific tactical performance 
requirement.  The Provisionals were confronted by a new challenge when 
many of its prime targets in Northern Ireland, police stations and barracks, 
began to be heavily fortified in the early 1970s.12  Initial attempts to 
circumvent these defences consisted of catapulting petrol bombs from nearby 
roofs and subsequently what is referred to as a ‘spigot grenade’,13 a container 
of explosive with a lit fuse attached to the end of a dowel rod, which was fired 
from a bow or shotgun.  Needless to say, both of these approaches left a lot to 
be desired in terms of safety and reliability and alternatives were sought.14  To 
anyone familiar with weapons at the time, mortars were a logical choice in 
order to overcome the physical hardening occurring around the PIRA’s 
favoured target facilities, such as police stations, which usually consisted of 
stronger perimeter fortifications but left the roofs of the facilities relatively 
unprotected.  In other words, the PIRA were driven to seek mortars by a 
tactical need.15  Other tactical advantages of mortars included: a) providing a 
standoff capability that would help shield their operators from detection;16 
and b) the high ballistic arc of a mortar made it possible to fire on targets 
fairly close to the launcher (at least when measured relative to other forms of 
                                                          
11 Oppenheimer, IRA, 232. The mortars had been concealed underground and were fired 
from an area close to the perimeter fence. 
12 Oppenheimer, IRA, 229. 
13 Ibid., 228-229. 
14 Ibid., 229. 
15 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. This was 
yet another example of where, ‘Above all, necessity–and the constant need to improvise, 
usually in covert and haphazard conditions–was the mother of IRA invention’ 
(Oppenheimer, IRA, xx). 
16 Personal correspondence with Dr. Brian Jackson, RAND, 16 May 2012. 
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artillery)–or even above it–which at times could be useful in built-up urban 
environments.17  
 
The security countermeasures installed by the British could conceivably have 
been dealt with in other ways, such as shifting to different targets, infiltrating 
facilities, building bigger bombs or finding simpler methods of getting bombs 
over the walls.  Upon closer inspection, however, none of these alternatives 
were really open to the PIRA of the early 1970s.  Target shifting was not an 
attractive option–the Provisionals were already trying to bring commercial 
activity in Northern Ireland to a standstill through bombing city centres in 
towns like Derry and Belfast and, at least in Northern Ireland, the PIRA did 
not want to be seen to intentionally target civilians.18  Allowing the other focus 
of their operations—British and Northern Ireland security forces–to retreat to 
the safety of their bases was not a viable option under the PIRA’s strategy of 
the time.  Furthermore, while their bomb-making was becoming more 
proficient and they were embarking on the production of home-made 
explosives, the days of the ‘city destroyer’ bombs of the 1990s were far off and 
it is doubtful whether the organization could have developed explosive 
devices big enough–and stationed them close enough–to blast their way 
through the fortifications.  Last, simpler methods had failed to show much 
promise: flare bombs were insufficient to cause much damage, the spigot 
grenades were too dangerous, and hijacking aircraft to drop bombs on the 
roofs of police stations was impractical on a large scale.19 
 
With respect to the decision makers and the decision process, much of this 
stemmed from the PIRA’s organizational structure.  Organizationally, the 
PIRA was something of a hybrid.  On the one hand, at the time of its split with 
the Official IRA in 1969, the PIRA theoretically inherited the well-defined, 
traditional structure of Irish Republican militants, which was modelled 
somewhat ironically on the British Army.20  Under this structure, supreme 
authority on a daily basis rested in the Army Council, which directed a 
General Headquarters (GHQ) consisting of ten specialist departments.  On 
the other hand, in practice, while overall strategy was laid out by the Army 
Council, operational control was far more decentralized.  Local units enjoyed 
a high degree of autonomy in such factors as targeting and weapons 
                                                          
17 See Oppenheimer, IRA, 228 for a similar idea. 
18 Jackson, Brian A. et al, Aptitude for Destruction-Vol. 2: Case Studies of Organizational 
Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 212. 
19 O’Doherty recounts an episode when he volunteered to go up in a helicopter to 
investigate whether it would be possible for explosives to be dropped on Strabane police 
station (author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty). 
20 English, Armed Struggle, 114; and Coogan, The IRA, 379. 
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employment.21  Therefore, the PIRA exhibited both top-down and bottom-up 
decision-making.22  
 
Yet, for a decision of the magnitude of whether or not to embark on a major 
enterprise like the acquisition or development of mortars, decision making 
likely took place at the center of the organization.23  In fact, O’Doherty 
specifically mentions the development of mortars as one of the few decisions 
that was centralized during his tenure with the organization in the early 
1970s.24  It is therefore extremely probable that the final decision regarding 
whether or not to acquire mortars, and whether to embark on an indigenous 
development program, would have rested with the Army Council.  It is quite 
unlikely, however, that the Army Council would make a decision to adopt 
mortars without some input from below.  The most probable sources of such 
input would be the department of the Quartermaster General (QMG) and the 
Engineering Department.  While the QMG would presumably have a greater 
say in the case of externally acquired mortar systems and the Engineering 
Department would predominate in discussions of internally developed 
mortars, both departments would likely be heavily involved in providing 
guidance and expert opinion to the Army Council (especially since the QMG 
usually sat on the Army Council itself). 
 
This somewhat bidirectional nature of decision making within the PIRA has 
been confirmed by a former law enforcement official familiar with PIRA 
command and control as being the most probable operationalization of the 
mortar adoption decision.  In this dynamic, bottom-up requirements and 
suggestions would filter up through the hierarchy to the Army Council from 
local units, and technical assessments of the feasibility of the endeavour 
would be given by those with expertise in GHQ (especially the Quartermaster 
and Engineering Departments).25  The Army Council would then make the 
final decision in a top-down fashion and implement it through the Chief of 
Staff and GHQ.26  Richard English has singled out the PIRA’s somewhat 
flexible command and decision making structure–the “combination of high-
                                                          
21 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and 
Functional Structure,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9:3 (1997): 23; Dillon, Martin, 
The Dirty War (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 153; Toolis, Kevin, Rebel Hearts: 
Journeys Within the IRA's Soul (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 319.  
22 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. 
23 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘D’, Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 19 June 2012.  
24 Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. 
25 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. 
26 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement officials ‘A’ and ‘D’. 
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level centralization with locally autonomous initiative”–as playing an 
important role in the PIRA’s constant efforts to innovate.27 
 
How did the decision to develop mortars relate to the PIRA’s overall tolerance 
for risk?  The PIRA at its inception was ready to engage in a variety of 
different combat modes.  The action orientation of young, ‘fired up’ recruits 
made them quite willing to engage British and RUC (Royal Ulster 
Constabulary) forces at close range in the streets.28  They were also willing to 
experiment with explosives (with several cases that brought tragic results29).  
Although the PIRA did calibrate its violence from time to time for political or 
strategic reasons, it engaged in fairly risky behavior throughout its lifespan 
(e.g., importing arms from Libya, using unwilling “human bombs”, and trying 
to attack both Margaret Thatcher and the British Prime Minister’s residence 
directly). 
 
With respect to its overall planning horizon, even after the initial decision to 
engage in the production of mortars and the production of the first relatively 
successful variants, the PIRA persisted in further phases of mortar 
development.  It even substantially expanded the breadth of its R&D 
program.  For example, there were another eleven models after the Mark 6, 
which was sufficiently reliable to be utilized in the high-profile 1994 attack on 
Heathrow Airport twenty years after it was first deployed.  The mortar 
program thus represented an ongoing, long-term development effort, which 
consisted of constantly attempting to increase the mortars’ effectiveness as 
weapons and decrease the risk posed to their handlers.  This long-term 
thinking was most cogently expressed in reports of the PIRA encouraging 
promising future technicians to remain in school in order to increase their 
technical knowledge, as in the case of Danny McNamee, who became a 
leading bomb-maker and was supported in his technical studies at Queen’s 
University, Belfast, by the PIRA.30 
 
Part of the reason for the length of the effort may have been that a degree of 
momentum arose, similar to that which develops behind many long-term 
development programs that are at least partially insulated from interference 
by the leadership or enemy forces.  Members of the mortar development 
                                                          
27 English, Richard, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA: (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 119. 
28 Shane Paul O’Doherty, The Volunteer: A Former IRA Man's True Story, (Durham, CT: 
Strategic Books Group, 2011), 60-61; Jackson et. al., “Provisional Irish Republican Army” 
in Aptitude for Destruction, 100. 
29 See, for example, Coogan, The IRA, 367. 
30 Oppenheimer, IRA, 275-276. 
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team, revelling in their technical prowess, may have been loath to cease 
working on a challenging system that attracted a large amount of external 
attention to the movement.  However, there were doubtless external, in 
addition to organizational, drivers of continued development. Offense and 
defence in general establish a co-evolutionary dynamic that, from the PIRA’s 
point of view, forced its ‘mortar offense’ to constantly adapt and grow in order 
to cope with more robust defences, or in Oppenheimer’s words, “to keep the 
authorities on the hop”.31  Larger, more penetrating mortars were required, 
for instance, by further British hardening of military structures specifically 
against mortars in the 1980s, including an empty top floor and a reinforced 
roof of their bases.32  Desensitization33 of the media, the British enemy, and 
even the group’s constituencies after multiple uses of the same weapon–some 
mortars were used hundreds of times–might also have driven the leadership 
to demand something new and extend the development program. 
 
Implementation 
The PIRA almost exclusively cultivated its mortars ‘in-house’, with the vast 
majority of components and production occurring within the organization.  
This was conducted mainly through its own institutional R&D organ, the 
Engineering Department (ED) of the Army General Headquarters, with some 
participation from certain highly dynamic local units, especially the South 
Armagh Brigade.  There was also some exploitation of existing commercial 
networks in the use of widely available legitimate products as the basic raw 
materials for mortars.  
 
It is also unclear exactly where the expertise required for developing mortars 
was acquired.  It is known that the PIRA drew on many talented amateurs 
(such as the Derry volunteers Shane Paul O’Doherty in the seventies and 
Patrick Flood in the eighties) who rapidly became proficient in their bomb-
making craft and were able to improvise extensively.  It is also known that the 
PIRA attracted a limited number of highly-skilled technical personnel, 
including professional engineers.34  With respect to weapons-specific 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 292. 
32 Urban, Mark, Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1992), 207; Geraghty, Tony, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA 
and British Intelligence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 94. 
33 Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism 
and the Western News Media (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), 172. 
34 In the 1980s, for example, the organization began to attract even more highly-
specialized individuals, such as Richard Johnson and Eamon McGuire, who had 
backgrounds in electrical and aeronautical engineering (McGuire, Eamon, Enemy of the 
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knowledge, there is evidence of early PIRA access to military manuals of 
various armed forces,35 certain members with military experience, at least 
some training by Libya,36 and even indications of transfer of military 
knowledge from Russia and Germany during the first half of the 20th 
century.37  It is thus likely that the expertise was derived from a kernel of 
inherited knowledge that was built upon by trial-and-error, a hypothesis 
borne out by the intense experimentation evident during the early period of 
mortar development.  As to the identity of the developers, directors of the 
Engineering Department, like Frank McGuiness38 and Gabriel Cleary,39 
probably had at least some involvement in the R&D process for mortars, while 
some of those individuals most closely associated with mortar development 
include Bernard Fox, Ciarain Chambers, and James ‘Mortar’ Monaghan.40 It 
has also been revealed that for most of the period of development, the PIRA 
stuck with more-or-less the same full-time R&D team, as evidenced by the 
discovery of signature welding marks and initiation devices that were 
consistent across various mortars.41 
 
Interestingly, the mortars’ designers might not have even conceived of their 
work as a structured development process at all, rather focusing on the next 
project as merely an exercise in providing a weapon that met the 
specifications that the operational personnel desired.  However, more 
decentralized local operatives were occasionally brought in to consult or to 
help with testing.42 
 
With respect to safety, while the organization as a whole did not want its 
members harmed in the course of their duties, safety did not always seem to 
be a high priority, especially in the early years.  Many of the explosives used 
were volatile and the designers did not include safety mechanisms in at least 
                                                          
Empire: Life as an International Undercover IRA Activist (Dublin: O'Brien Books, 
2006)). 
35 Oppenheimer, IRA, 242; author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty, Athlone, 
Republic of Ireland, 20 June 2012. 
36 Patrick Magee, one of the PIRA’s best-known bomb makers, allegedly went to Libya for 
training in the 1970s (Oppenheimer, IRA, 263, 282; author interview with Shane Paul 
O’Doherty). 
37 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’, Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 19 June 2012. 
38 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 439. 
39 O’Callaghan, Sean, The Informer (London: Corgi Books, 1999), 305. 
40 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’; Horgan 
and Taylor, “Provisional Irish Republican Army”, 14; Oppenheimer, IRA, 99, 281.  
41 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’, Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 18 June 2012 and author interview with former Northern Ireland law 
enforcement official ‘B’, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 18 June 2012. 
42 Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty. 
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the first five variants, resulting in ‘own goals’, such as the death of two PIRA 
volunteers from the premature explosion of a Mark 3 mortar in 1973.43  
However, much of the impetus for continuing to develop mortars after the 
fairly successful Mark 6 was to improve safety.  With respect to operational 
security, the PIRA, for much of its operational lifespan, enjoyed some degree 
of succor from supporters in rural areas of the Republic of Ireland and faced 
Irish authorities that were not really equipped to pursue them, thus providing 
the organization with a form of safe haven in the South.  Thus, operational 
security in these areas was less of an issue.  However, in Northern Ireland and 
England, they were under increasing security pressure, including infiltrators, 
informers, and surveillance by a variety of British security forces (including 
the British Army, the RUC and the Special Branch).44  This made security an 
increasing priority and was one of the main reasons that most of the mortar 
development had to take place in the Irish Republic.  
 
Turning to the process by which the mortars were produced, Error! Reference 
source not found. provides a detailed chronological account of the PIRA 
development of mortars.  There are, however, a few key points about the 
production process in general that are not included in the table.  First, there is 
some uncertainty as to where the actual development of mortars took place 
and whether this development was at a single or multiple locations.  One 
opinion is that the PIRA had a single ‘factory’ responsible for producing 
mortars, but that the location of this factory changed from time to time.45  
Reports of Irish police raids in the early 1970s, however, suggest that there 
were different locations for different components, including a factory in 
Dublin (discovered in 1975) that fabricated firing tubes and a light 
engineering works in County Cavan (uncovered in 1976) where the mortar 
shell casings were being manufactured.46  There are also reports that place 
South Armagh as a hub of mortar building and testing activity in the 1970s.47  
In 1988, the PIRA allegedly established a mortar bomb factory in Belfast 
itself, in the Andersonstown area,48 and Tony Geraghty reports that in 
December of the same year, the discovery of a PIRA bomb ‘factory’ in South 
London revealed items associated with the manufacture of the Mark 10 
                                                          
43 O’Callaghan, The Informer, 84-85. This to some extent paralleled the wider safety 
issues that the PIRA was having at the time when it came to dealing with explosives. For 
example, in June 1970 much of Derry’s PIRA leadership (together with two children) 
were killed while constructing bombs in a kitchen (Toolis, Rebel Hearts, 304). 
44 Dillon, Martin, The Dirty War (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990). 
45 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’. 
46 Oppenheimer, IRA, 170. 
47 Harnden, Toby, Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armagh (London: Coronet Books, 
2000), 233. 
48 Dillon, The Dirty War, 292. 
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mortar, indicating that some mortar production might even have been 
occurring outside of Ireland.49  One might speculate that during the initial 
period, mortar development took place mainly in the Republic of Ireland (and 
some Republican strongholds like South Armagh), but that as the PIRA’s 
production capabilities matured and the number of mortars sought increased, 
production locations multiplied and became more local to their places of 
intended use. 
 
Second, with respect to the explosive components of the mortars, explosives 
used as the main charge in mortars could generally be sourced from almost 
the entire range of the PIRA’s prodigious arsenal of explosives types,50 
although lighter charges, and hence more powerful ‘high’ explosives, were 
probably preferred in most mortars to meet the exigencies of aerodynamics.  
This was made easier after the PIRA received large quantities of Semtex high 
explosive from Libya in the mid-1980s.  Trigger, timing, and power units for 
the mortar systems could similarly be drawn from the extensive broader PIRA 
inventories and expertise in these areas.51  The propellant used to launch the 
mortar was a different matter entirely.  This had to be carefully formulated to 
achieve a safe and reliable launch, imparting a relatively steady explosive 
force to the mortar shell in order to ensure a consistent range.  Error! Reference 
source not found. traces the evolution of propellants, from early reliance on 
commercially available shotgun and related powder cartridges, through the J-
cloth,52 to the more sophisticated purpose-built and precisely measured 
propellants that formed part of the weapon itself. 
 
Third, construction of the non-explosive components of the mortar showed 
just as much ingenuity.  Early seizures of mortars, like that in 1974, informed 
the security forces that components such as the housing were being 
manufactured in a facility containing at least a metal lathe and heavy welding 
equipment, akin to a light engineering workshop.53  The aforementioned raids 
of PIRA mortar production facilities in 1974 and 1975 indicated an incipient 
                                                          
49 Geraghty, Tony, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British 
Intelligence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 192. 
50 When supplies of commercial explosives like gelignite became scarce during the first 
phase of mortar development, specialist units in the PIRA focused on the manufacture of 
home-made explosives and developed multiple recipes, mostly based on various 
compounds containing ammonium nitrate fertilizer. See, among others, Jackson, 
Aptitude for Destruction, 99; and O’Callaghan, The Informer, 89. 
51 For an extensive discussion, see Oppenheimer, “Chapter X,” in IRA. 
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light industrial capacity,54 which undoubtedly grew as the larger mortar 
models were developed to the point where Oppenheimer characterizes this 
capability as having a production line quality.55  Many of the raw materials for 
mortar components were sourced from commercially available pipes and gas 
cylinders, thus minimizing the amount of machine tooling required. 
 
The path to developing a robust mortar capability did not proceed without 
incident, however.  The PIRA experienced several difficulties and setbacks, 
which can also be gleaned from a close look at Error! Reference source not 
found..  The accuracy of many of the models was poor, not only of the earlier 
attempts, but sometimes (as with the Marks 7, 8, and 9) accuracy was 
knowingly traded for greater explosive power.  Another major problem was 
the safety of the initial devices, as mentioned above.  Compounding safety and 
accuracy issues was a lack of detonation reliability–many of the mortars, even 
if they did not blow up on launch or hit the wrong target, failed to detonate 
upon impacting the intended target.  Nonetheless, the PIRA’s technicians 
persevered with the development of mortars and were eventually successful in 
addressing many of the problems of safety and reliability through a number of 
ingenious advances, from impeller-operated arming mechanisms to 
sophisticated timers and triggers.  Although accuracy presented a perennial 
problem, even this improved markedly.  For example, according to a former 
Northern Ireland law enforcement official, in the 1985 attack on the Newry 
Police Station, the landing locations of the several mortars used were closely 
grouped, indicating a fair amount of accuracy and reliability in ballistic 
trajectory.56  These achievements were all the more remarkable when one 
considers that over the entire period of development, the PIRA was under 
intense security pressures.  
 
Analysis 
The basic tactical need underlying the decision to adopt mortars has been 
detailed above.  Yet, the key question in this regard is why the PIRA decided 
to produce this capability themselves, rather than, for example, procuring 
mortars on international arms markets.  Reasons for taking on this complex 
engineering task include the following: 
 
 Difficulties Associated with External Acquisition: The PIRA sourced 
many of its weapons through patronage (primarily through the 
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largesse of Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi and Irish-American 
sympathizers in the United States)57 and exploitation (such as 
purchasing arms from third party suppliers or stealing detonators 
from commercial quarries), but these sources presented certain 
disadvantages for more sophisticated weapons like mortars. First of 
all, the basic purchase of weapons systems on the open market can be 
expensive, and can open the organization’s activities up to interdiction 
or infiltration by security forces which can simply monitor known 
arms suppliers, not to mention the additional resource costs and risks 
associated with transporting, storing and maintaining purchased 
arms.58 While the IRA had a steady funding stream for most of its 
existence, especially in the early years this funding was limited. 
Moreover, several of the organization’s attempts to import arms, 
whether from purchases or overseas patrons, were interdicted in the 
1970s and 1980s, with notable examples being seizures of weapons at 
Schipol Airport (1971) and on the ships, the Claudia (1973), the Marita 
Ann (1984) and the Eksund (1987).59 Some reports list mortars among 
the seized weapons,60 but it can be inferred that, while the 
organization’s officers might have attempted to include externally-
sourced mortars in large arms consignments at various times, these 
attempts were not successful, since this type of mortar was never used 
by the PIRA. Furthermore, a former law enforcement official has 
stated that the PIRA never procured commercially available mortars.61 
Possessing an internal production capability would obviate many of 
these risks, because large numbers of mortars did not need to be 
stored, but could be manufactured as needed. Also, any interdictions 
of mortars would not negate the knowledge of how to build new ones 
in the future,62 and necessary components could be purchased 
legitimately – and more cheaply – than military mortars.63  
 
 Specific Tactical Requirements: The PIRA had usage requirements 
that differed substantially from military mortars.  While military 
mortars were designed for fairly long ranges (~5,000m), to have the 
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firer present upon launch and to be used numerous times, the nature 
of the PIRA’s covert terrorist campaign meant that it required mortars 
operative over shorter ranges (within the confines of a city), with 
options to fire remotely and where the launcher was generally 
abandoned after a single use.64  Moreover, military mortars required 
expertise and practice to aim correctly and achieve desired accuracy; 
the PIRA volunteers launching mortars from the back of a van and 
aiming in the general direction of a police station were operating 
under different functional constraints.65 Producing its own mortars 
would thus allow the PIRA to customize weapons for its own purposes. 
 
 Deficit of Trust in Externally Sourced Materials: As the conflict in 
Northern Ireland wore on, there were increasing cases of British or 
RUC counterintelligence personnel ‘doctoring’ or otherwise sabotaging 
PIRA weapons–including guns with built-in surveillance devices or 
explosives that would not detonate.66  This led to PIRA engineers 
having decreased confidence in externally-sourced materiel and 
provided an additional impetus to produce those weapons internally 
when it could. 
 
 DIY Prestige: In addition to the purely tactical advantages of 
particular weapons, there were also the symbolic messages that would 
be tacitly conveyed by the use of a particularly sophisticated weapon.  
It is reported that at all levels of the PIRA, from the organization as a 
whole to individual units, there was often the desire to show various 
audiences, whether it was the British, its Catholic constituency, or even 
other brigades in the PIRA, how ingenious, capable, and terrifying the 
PIRA could be–an indigenous mortar capability would thus bestow 
propaganda benefits on its developers.67 
 
 Technical Confidence and Constituencies: The PIRA possessed one of 
the most mature, highly-skilled, and productive research and 
development organs in the annals of violent non-state organizations, 
the so-called Engineering Department.  The ED’s committed and 
cunning senior technicians were responsible for numerous 
breakthroughs in the arts and instruments of clandestine war against 
the state and enjoyed a substantial level of influence as the PIRA’s 
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elite.68  Their early successes with explosives mixtures in the 1970s 
(following some initial missteps in this regard) might have given them 
(and the PIRA’s senior command) the confidence that they could take 
on the difficult task of developing an effective mortar capability.  Even 
if this confidence had been lacking among members of the Army 
Council or other senior leadership, the ED enjoyed a degree of 
independence from frontline operations,69 and the decision to engage 
in the development and production of mortars may have been the 
PIRA leadership’s way of “letting the movement's better technical 
intellects have their experiments”.70  The subsequent history of the 
organization certainly presents many examples of highly educated and 
skilled individuals being given more or less free rein to develop or 
acquire new weapons technologies.71 
 
 Weapon Evolution: Indigenous development allowed for the PIRA’s 
mortar capability to evolve over time, and adapt to new requirements 
and developments, whereas if mortars were externally sourced, a new 
product would have to be identified, possibly necessitating the 
development of a relationship with a different supplier and the 
locating of new transport channels. 
 
There were thus several synergistic factors pushing the PIRA in the direction 
of putting the time, resources, and effort into developing their own mortar 
systems.  While indigenous production might have been overdetermined, and 
it is difficult to say whether any single one of these factors would have been 
sufficient to encourage the organization to move in this direction, the specific 
tactical requirements and lack of trust in external sources of weapons both 
provided strong incentives to develop mortars internally.  
 
We can now turn to examine the key determinants of the PIRA’s success in 
this regard.  After a thorough analysis of the context surrounding the PIRA’s 
development of mortars, three interrelated factors stand out as most salient.  
The first factor stems from the PIRA’s organizational and individual expertise 
and access to required materials.  The PIRA inherited a lot of latent 
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knowledge from before the 1969 split, which meant that the organization did 
not have to start from scratch, so to speak, either technically or 
organizationally and, although it was strapped for weapons and other 
resources in 1970, it was able to build on its legacy capabilities to quickly 
reconstitute its expertise and access to resources.  In addition, the socio-
economic background of its membership ended up serving it well in the area 
of weapons development. The majority of its members were working-class 
Catholics, who while not necessarily possessing the technical skills for 
weapons development, brought with them a basic inventiveness, creativity, 
and ‘working men’s skillsets’ like machining and welding.  In addition to the 
direct value of such experience in the fabrication of mortars, this background 
quickly allowed the organization to develop a high level of practical skill–
something that was essential for solving the obstacles encountered in 
developing improvised weapons.  At the same time, the appeal of the PIRA 
was sufficiently broad that the organization was able to attract the services of 
a small number of highly-trained individuals, including engineers, chemists, 
and computer scientists to provide the requisite knowledge of aerodynamics, 
timing systems, and so forth.  There was also an organizational structure that 
was set up to promote and implement innovation from the very beginning.  
The embodiment of this institutionalization of R&D, the Engineering 
Department was somewhat isolated and protected from frontline operations, 
which allowed for the possibility of long-term R&D projects like mortars.  At 
the same time, the organization also made room for local EOs (explosives 
officers) in the various towns in the North to react to local conditions and 
independently engage in local-level innovation, which could then filter back to 
the center.72 
 
The second major contributor to success was its access to safe havens. The 
existence of a large area in the Republic of Ireland in which to conduct 
research, production, and testing that was beyond the reach of British 
authorities has been identified as a key element in the success of the PIRA’s 
mortar program.73 
 
Last was the PIRA’s culture of learning.  In the area of weapons development, 
the PIRA displayed an aptitude for learning that is unrivalled among terrorist 
groups.  The first form of learning it engaged in was pre-employment testing 
of weapons systems.  O’Callaghan describes firing mortars with dummy shells 
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at Inch Strand on the inner side of the Dingle Peninsula, where the shells 
would land undamaged on the sandy beach,74 while O’Doherty describes 
visiting a farm in Kildare in 1972 where mortars were tested for range and 
weight-bearing capability.75  The second aspect of the culture of learning was 
the willingness and institutionalization of post-operation analysis.  When 
things went wrong with an attack, the operatives conducting the attack would 
be debriefed by superiors.  Of course, ‘own goals’ (where the PIRA operatives 
were themselves killed) made it very difficult to identify the source of the 
failure.76  After-action reporting did not only occur when missions went 
awry–this practice was so pervasive that it has been described as ‘debrief–
win, lose or draw’.77  While the PIRA was unable to perform technical analyses 
of successful attacks or even observable failures (since the mortars or their 
remnants would be within the control of the authorities), they did the next 
best thing, by sending observers to stand at police cordons and try to gather 
as much information about the effects of the attack or the unexploded 
ordinance as possible.78  This commitment to constant learning and 
improvement was a powerful enabler of the rapid development and success of 
the mortar program. 
 
The sustained development of mortars, which included all system 
components, from the casing and the propellant to the warhead and the 
trigger mechanisms, undoubtedly constituted a prime example of complex 
engineering by a terrorist organization.  This was born out of tactical necessity 
but enabled by good organizational practices and access to materials, 
expertise, and places in which to leverage these.  As Oppenheimer contends, 
“…it was in the series of homemade mortars produced by the IRA that its 
ingenuity was revealed, and its ability to supplement imported war-fighting 
equipment by developing its own.”79 
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Appendix A: PIRA Mortar Development 
Relevant Period Designation 
Date First 
Aware 
Range Payload 
Other Salient 
Characters 
Notable Associated 
Attacks 
Notes 
Prior 
to 
1972 
No Capability 
‘Spigot 
Grenade’80 
Early 
1970s 
 
2 kg gelignite 
 
- 15 cm pipe. 
- Fired from 
shotgun. 
 
 
- Developed to deal 
with fortified 
police stations. 
- Viewed as too 
dangerous for 
volunteers to use. 
1972-
1974 
Intense 
Experimentation 
Flare 
‘Mortar’81 
1973 
‘flew far’ 
 
‘limited’ amount of 
PETN 
 
- ‘Proto-mortar’ 
using marine 
flares. 
- Replaced flare 
material with 
detonator, 
explosive and a 
fuse. 
 
- Was not used 
beyond the town of 
Derry. 
 
  Mark 182 June 1972  
250g commercial 
plastic explosive 
 
- Mortar made up 
of 50mm copper 
pipe, with 
.303 cartridge in 
rear as propellant.  
- Triggered by 
driving spike 
against .22 
cartridge 
(probably nail 
gun-type ‘Hilti’ 
cartridge) to 
ignite detonator. 
- Described as 
having an 
 
 
 
- Would spin once 
took off. 
- No safety 
mechanism, so it 
was dangerous to 
user. 
- Failed to explode 
if fuse damaged by 
impact at wrong 
angle. 
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ingenious nose-
cone fuse design. 
 
 
 
 
Mark 283 
December 
1972 
 
1 kg commercial 
explosive 
 
- 20cm long, 
57mm diameter 
steel pipe. 
- 12-gauge 
shotgun cartridge 
as propellant. 
- 5 second delay 
from impact to 
ignition from a 
split fuse. 
- Modified, more 
reliable nose cone. 
- First PIRA mortar 
fatality: British 
soldier attempting 
to defuse wayward 
mortar fired in Turf 
Lodge, Belfast in 
December 1972. 
- Often fired 
through the roof of 
the target building. 
- Used 25 times in 
its first four 
months. 
- Accuracy still 
poor because of 
movement of the 
base-plate. 
  Mark 384 1973 
250m 
 
 
0.5 kg high-grade 
crystalline 
ammonium nitrate, 
boosted by 
aluminum powder 
 
- 60mm mortar 
barrel; static 
firing pin and 
Hilti cartridge as 
detonator; ‘J-
cloth’ (sodium 
chlorate-soaked) 
used as a 
propellant. 
- Accuracy 
increased through 
use of stronger 
base plate and 
configurable 
aiming quadrant. 
- Cut main 
explosive charge 
- Attacks on 
Creggan Camp, 
Derry and Lisanelly 
barracks, Omagh in 
1973 (16 mortars). 
- Failed attack on 
RUC Pomeroy 
barracks in August 
1973 resulted in two 
IRA men killed. 
- Highly volatile 
explosive tended to 
explode 
prematurely. 
- Unreliable, given 
to tumbling in 
flight. 
- Accuracy within 
30m over 300m. 
- Used 105 times in 
14 separate attacks 
in first six months. 
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by half from 
previous model. 
  Mark 485 1974 400m 
0.45 kg ammonium 
nitrate, with up to 
15% aluminum 
powder 
 
- Extended range 
version of Mark 3. 
- Used greater 
amount of J-cloth 
as the propellant. 
- Contained ball 
bearings 
- No safety 
mechanism, so 
used as a 
traditional 
military mortar. 
- Attack on base at 
Strabane (14 
mortars did not 
function). 
- Dangerous: could 
explode in tube 
and had no safety 
mechanism. 
- Was abandoned 
in six months. 
  Mark 586 1974 25m  - ‘Bombard’-like. - Never used. 
- Discovered 
during raid on IRA 
workshop in 
Antrim in 1974. 
  Mark 687 1974 
1,097m 
 
1.36  kg explosive 
charge (often 
Semtex), detonated 
by .22 cartridge on 
impact 
 
- 60mm calibre. 
- Standard launch 
tube, strong base 
plate and bipod. 
- .22 calibre 
cartridge initiated 
homemade 
gunpowder 
propellant after 
dropping mortar 
shell down tube. 
- Contained an 
impeller to arm 
itself during flight 
(advanced 
- Cross-border 
attack on County 
Armaugh army 
observation post in 
1974. 
- Extensive damage 
caused when 
thrown by hand 
onto roof of 
armoured vehicle in 
Divis Flats, Belfast 
in 1987. 
- 1994 Heathrow 
attacks. 
- First reliable 
device (much safer 
and longer range 
minimized risk of 
detection). 
- Warheads in 
Heathrow attacks 
made from 
drainpipes with 
tailfins. 
- 28 intact units 
found in Belfast 
bakery in 1974; 
allowed security 
forces to gain 
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technology). 
- 8 aluminum fins. 
- Electric trigger 
system using 
remote control 
technology. 
intimate working 
knowledge. 
1975-
1987 
Approaching 
Military Grade 
Mark 788 1976  
> Mark 6 
 
- Longer version 
of Mark 6 (1m 
tube). 
 
- Used against 
Army-RUC base at 
Crossmaglen in 
1976. 
- Poor flight 
stability because of 
length. 
- Sacrificed 
accuracy for 
greater payload. 
  Mark 889 1976  > Mark 6 
- Longer version 
of Mark 6 (1m 
tube). 
- ‘Cannibalized’ 
version of earlier 
models. 
 
- Poor flight 
stability. 
- Less 
sophisticated. 
  Mark 990 1976  5 kg explosive 
- Produced from 
cut-down gas 
cylinders, so 
shorter, fatter 
profile. 
- Could be 
launched in 
groups of up to 10 
tubes. 
- October 1976 
attack on 
Crossmaglen base; 
7 mortars 
detonated. 
- 1977: 5 warheads 
off target landed in 
school grounds in 
Belfast. 
- Sacrificed 
accuracy for 
explosive payload. 
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  Mark 1091 
1979 
 
300m 
 
Variously reported as 
11kg (Boyne and 
Horgan) and 20kg-
100kg (Geraghty and 
Oppenheimer) of 
explosive (1991 
attack used “ANNIE” 
ammonium nitrate 
and nitrobenzene 
mix; sometimes 
Semtex) 
- 150 mm 
diameter, 1.2m 
long warhead 
made from gas 
cylinders. 
- Fine black 
powder as 
propellant in base 
allowed accurate 
ranging. 
- Incorporated 
safety pin and 
weight-based 
safety mechanism 
with detonation 
on impact.  
- Detonated by 
electrical timers. 
- Multiple (up to 
10) launch tubes 
(‘set at varying 
angles for 
maximum target 
coverage’ - 
Oppenheimer, p. 
234). 
- First fatality 
caused by mortar 
attack in South 
Armagh in March 
1979. 
- Corry Square 
Police Station, 
Newry attack - 
April 1980. 
- 1985 Newry police 
station attack (9 
killed). 
- Used in 1991 
attack on British 
Cabinet on 
Downing Street. 
- Often launched 
from the back of a 
truck. 
- Incorporated 
incendiary in 
base/launchers to 
destroy forensic 
evidence after 
launch. 
- Became 
‘workhorse’ of 
mortar arsenal 
during 1980s, but 
‘wide angles’ of 
attack meant that 
chances of civilian 
injury still high. 
1988-
1998 
Bigger and 
Better 
Mark 1192 
1989 
 
519m 
 
10 kg (often ANNIE) 
 
 
- Used in May 1989 
against a British 
Army observation 
post in 
Glassdrumman, 
South Armagh. 
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  (Mark 1293) 1989  2.5 kg Semtex 
- Not actually a 
mortar, since 
utilized direct fire 
from a horizontal 
position. 
- 75cm long. 
- Inertia fuse and 
triggered by 
command wire or 
timer. 
- Employed a 
shaped charge to 
pierce armour. 
- Attack on 
Crossmaglen, 
October 1989. 
- Ostensibly made 
British armoured 
vehicles obsolete. 
  Mark 1394 1990 35m 36 kg 
- Made from 45-
gallon oil drum. 
- Launched from a 
spigot. 
- Short range 
meant required 
truck or tractor as 
a launching pad. 
- First used in 
attack on 
Dungannon, May 
1990. 
- Sometimes used 
diesel fuel tanks as 
projectiles. 
  Mark 1495 1992  
20 kg of home-made 
explosive 
- Made from top 
halves of two gas 
cylinders welded 
together. 
- May 1992 attack 
on Crossmaglen 
base. 
 
  Mark 1596 1992 
100-275m 
(depending 
on version) 
70-75 kg of 
ammonium nitrate 
- 360mm 
diameter cylinder. 
- Tube was 3 
metres long. 
- Included coins 
as shrapnel. 
- Army base in 
Ballygawley, 
County Tyrone, 
December 1992. 
- British base in 
Osnabruck, 
Germany in June 
1996. 
- ‘Barrack buster’. 
- Brought down 
British helicopters 
in March, July 
1994. 
- Improvised from 
widely available 
gas cylinder used 
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for cooking / 
heating. 
  
(Mark 1697) 
 
1993 
 
Effective 
20-25m, up 
to 200m 
900g Semtex 
 
- Horizontal, 
direct fire weapon 
(like Mark 12). 
- Small and 
lightweight, no 
anchoring of base 
plate required 
(could be shoulder 
launched). 
- Shaped charge. 
- July 1993 attack 
on William Street, 
Derry. 
- Sometimes 
launched from 
under bonnet of 
car. 
- Unlike Mark 12, 
made from easily 
acquired parts with 
minimal 
machining needed. 
  Mark 1798 1994-1995   
- Described as one 
of the PIRA's most 
destructive 
weapons. 
- Never used. 
 
- Built during mid-
1990s ceasefire. 
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